A bigger target
National security editor Patrick Walters
February 26, 2005
WHEN the vanguard of Australia's armoured force rolls into the dusty wastes of Muthanna province in southern Iraq around April25, John Howard will be at Anzac Cove. As Australia's defence force begins its largest deployment inside Iraq, including the existing level, the Prime Minister's mind no doubt will turn to the young men and women encamped beside the ancient waters of the River Euphrates - 2000km to the east of Gallipoli's fabled shores.
Australian forces will soon enter their third year of active service in Iraq and this week's decision to send 450 Australian combat troops to the southern part of the country to protect Japanese soldiers involved in assistance projects has been one of the hardest of Howard's prime ministership.
"He agonised over whether it was the right decision. He talked it over and over," observed one senior government source who was privy to a remarkable three-week episode in Australian strategic policy-making.
Suddenly, an unlikely confluence of political, military and diplomatic imperatives has forced Howard to overturn his hitherto extreme reluctance to send more Australian troops to Iraq.
As with East Timor in 1999 and the recent tsunami disaster, Iraq has confronted Howard with simultaneous challenge and opportunity. Nine years as prime minister and dealing with a range of regional crises have helped him gradually overcome his instinctive caution when it comes to foreign policy -- with significant implications for Australia's global posture. The planned 12-month-long mission to southern Iraq is a genuine political risk for the Government.
"We are at a tilting point," Howard asserted this week, pointing to Iraq's faltering steps towards a more democratic system and the possible failure of the US-led coalition's grand design for the country.
But Howard also understands that the implications of an increased Australian presence extend way beyond the cauldron of Iraq to our strategic interests in North Asia -- not least with Tokyo.
"It's the right decision. It's difficult. I know it's not popular with some people, but it's the right decision and, in the fullness of time, that will be demonstrated," Howard said confidently on Thursday.
Since US-led forces blitzed their way into Baghdad in April 2003, Howard has been insistent that Australia's role would largely confined to the "sharp end" or combat phase. Our 2000-strong contingent played a small but important role in March and April 2003 during the advance on Baghdad with the army, air force and navy involved in fighting.
The peacekeeping role, Howard asserted, would be a burden for other nations to take up. Australia's defence task has since been limited to niche, non-combat roles, including logistics and medical back-up for the coalition forces and training the new Iraqi army.
As the insurgency gathered pace in Iraq last year, the paucity of Australia's post-war military contribution became something of an embarrassment for our military in dealing with their British and US counterparts. At the political level Washington and London understood Howard's position so well that the issue of bolstering our army presence was never raised. In mid-2004 Foreign Affairs Minister Alexander Downer quietly rebuffed approaches from UN secretary-general Kofi Annan to supply troops to protect the UN mission inside Iraq.
"We talk the talk but we are doing f---ing nothing. We should be doing more in Iraq," one senior Australian source said at the time -- noting that Canberra had largely "cut and run" from its responsibilities as an occupying power immediately after the cessation of hostilities.
It was only seven weeks ago, when it became clear the Netherlands Government would not resile from its decision to bring home its 1400-strong force from the British-controlled sector of southern Iraq, that Australian defence planners began to contemplate sending fresh troops.
When the Australian cabinet's national security committee met last week, firm options for Australia's military deployment had been drawn up. Our defence force had already ruled out taking over responsibility for security for the whole Muthanna province, which would have required a far bigger force than Australia could efficiently sustain. The NSC signed off on a smaller combined-arms detachment with the proviso that British forces would provide logistics, medical and military-police back-up. The decision was contingent on formal requests for help being forwarded from Tokyo and from Iyad Allawi's interim government in Baghdad.
According to senior government sources, Howard's rethink on Iraq has been heavily influenced by two key developments.
First the January 30 election in Iraq generated fresh optimism about the country's troubled political trajectory. The better than expected election turnout prompted Howard to reflect on his initially lukewarm response to the overtures made last month by British Defence Secretary Geoff Hoon to Australian Defence Minister Robert Hill and quickly followed up by British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw with his Australian counterpart Downer only days later.
"I think one of the more inspiring images of recent years is that of Iraqis holding aloft their fingers with the identification ink recording their participation in the first democratic operation that country has had," Howard said on Tuesday after cabinet had given its assent to the new mission.
Howard's judgment remains that a victory for the insurgents in Iraq would strike a mortal blow to the prospects for democracy in the Middle East as well as to Western interests.
"This is the first serious democratic experiment in an Arab country - if that is successful and that becomes contagious, then I think you have seen a major change in the Middle East," he says.
Another vital consideration was Japan - a strategic partner with more soldiers inside Iraq than Australia. As Howard has acknowledged, a phone call from Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi a week ago "weighed crucially" on his mind.
The Japanese leader's official request for help followed several discussions between Downer and his counterpart Nobutaka Machimura about Australia taking over responsibility for guarding the Japanese once Dutch forces quit Iraq in April.
Koizumi's plea was followed up last Monday by British Prime Minister Tony Blair, who phoned Howard to reconfirm Straw's written request for Australia to deploy troops to southern Iraq with the specific task to protect the 550 Japanese army engineers based at Samawah, on the Euphrates. Finally, Australia's Chief of the Defence Force Peter Cosgrove and Chief of Army Peter Leahy have reassured nervous cabinet ministers that a small-scale military deployment to a relatively safe area of Iraq could be undertaken without undue risk.
What hazards lie ahead for our soldiers? Thanks to very high professionalism and a hefty dose of luck, our defence force has yet to suffer a single fatality in Iraq.
The best assessment of Australia's intelligence agencies is that the projected one-year Muthanna deployment will face no more potential dangers than our forces already face in Baghdad. While there are still plenty of attacks against Shia targets from suspected Sunni insurgents, conditions in the south are relatively benign.
"I can't guarantee that there won't be incidents," Howard conceded this week. "But it's a lot better and this is a much safer part of Iraq than the Sunni triangle."
Coalition military figures show that 30 to 40 attacks occurred in the province last year compared with about 7000 in Baghdad alone. Violent attacks stem mainly from inter-tribal feuds and criminal gangs rather than from the insurgents who have wrought havoc in and around Baghdad.
The Australians are expected to have their own national headquarters but will come under overall command of the British, who are responsible for all coalition forces in the south.
Coalition military sources say the overall security outlook is gradually improving, noting that there have been fewer attacks since the January 30 elections and fewer attacks on coalition forces. The capability of Iraqi police forces is also steadily improving, according to coalition forces, after the severe desertion problems experienced in the run-up to the poll. If training of Iraqi security forces can be accelerated, the British are hoping that they can begin to phase out their 9500-strong force later this year.
As well as guarding Japanese engineers engaged in building schools, roads and bridges, a separate detachment of Australian soldiers will continue to train the new Iraqi army.
John Cantwell, commander of the army's Darwin-based 1st Brigade, from which most of the new Iraq deployment will be drawn, says his troops will be fully trained and equipped for their new assignment. Some of those going to the south will have served in Iraq as part of the security detachment guarding the Australian embassy.
"Everywhere in Iraq is a dangerous place," Cantwell observes. "There are places that are more dangerous than others. Al-Muthanna is much less dangerous than other parts of Iraq."
Rules of engagement for the Australians are still being worked out. Particular attention will be given to the sensitive issue of Iraqi detainees, with very strict conditions expected to apply.
The largest province in geographical area in the south, Muthanna is overwhelmingly Shia with a population of fewer than 400,000. The largest town and provincial capital, al-Samawah, near where the Australians will make their base, straddles the Euphrates river and numbers about 125,000.
Howard's change of heart promises to recast the domestic political debate over Iraq. He knows the troop commitment could be deeply unpopular with the electorate. But his sudden announcement also caught the Opposition napping.
Labor, always opposed to the war, is still struggling to develop a coherent position on Iraq after the debacle of Mark Latham's "home by Christmas" line. The ALP's position this week that the 450-strong Iraq detachment is inadequately equipped and that it will hurt the defence force's ability to deploy closer to home lacked credibility. The Aceh deployment is being rapidly phased down and the operational tempo of the defence force is far lower than at the height of the East Timor deployment in 1999-2000.
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